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[forthcoming, Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA] 
 
Intellectual Property as Seen by Barbie and Mickey: The Reciprocal Relationship of 








Some years ago, caselaw on trademark parodies and similar unauthorized 
“speech” uses of trademarks could have led one to conclude that the law had no 
sense of humor.  Over time, however, courts in the US and elsewhere began to 
leaven likelihood of confusion analyses with healthy skepticism regarding 
consumers’ alleged inability to perceive a joke.  These decisions did not always 
expressly cite the copyright fair use defense, but the considerations underlying the 
copyright doctrine seemed to inform trademark analysis as well.   The spillover 
effect may indeed have been inevitable, as several of the cases in which the fair 
use defense prevailed coupled copyright and trademark claims. 
 
Just as copyright law has influenced the development of trademark doctrine in the 
US, so has trademark law evolved a reciprocal relationship with copyright, 
potentially extending the protection of certain copyrighted works, notably cartoon 
characters, beyond the copyright term.   
 
This essay will first address how the US copyright fair use doctrine has allowed 
US federal judges in trademarks cases to connect with their inner comic impulses.  
Second, I will consider the conflict between trademark law’s potentially eternal 
duration and copyright’s constitutionally mandated limited times, particularly in 
the context of visual characters such as Mickey Mouse.  Looking to EU law, I will 
also offer some additional considerations regarding the use of expired 
copyrighted works as trademarks. 
 
While those analyses address trademarks and copyright as potential antagonists 
where exercise of trademark rights threatens to frustrate copyright policies, there 
is another side of the coin. To an increasing extent, we are seeing trademark 
symbols become characters and acquire value not only as source-indicators, but 
also as artistic (or audiovisual) works. I will conclude by considering the value 
that copyright protection might add to registered trademarks.   
 
In his celebrated concurrence in Laugh It Off v. South African Breweries
1
, South African 
Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs famously asked:  
                                                 
*
 This essay is based on the Christopher Meyer Lecture, delivered Nov 13, 2017, which in turn was based in part on 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Licensing Commercial Value: From Copyright to Trademarks and Back, in Irene Calboli and 
Jacques de Werra, eds., THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS: A GLOBAL AND 
LOCAL OUTLOOK 53 (Edward Elgar 2016).  Thanks for research assistance to Allyson Mackavage Columbia 
Law School class of 2015 and to Nathalie Russell, Columbia Law School class of 2018. 





Does the law have a sense of humour?   This question is raised whenever the irresistible 
force of free expression, in the form of parody, meets the immovable object of property 




Some years ago, the US caselaw on trademark parodies and similar unauthorized “speech” uses 
of trademarks could have led one to conclude that the law (at least as expressed by US federal 
judges) had no sense of humor.
3
  Over time, however, US courts began to leaven likelihood of 
confusion analyses with healthy skepticism regarding consumers’ alleged inability to perceive a 
joke.
4
   Courts even suggested that the first amendment might require a more persuasive showing 
of likely confusion when expressive works were alleged to infringe.
5
   These decisions did not 
always expressly cite the copyright fair use defense, but the considerations underlying the 
copyright doctrine seemed to inform trademark analysis as well.
6
 The spillover effect may indeed 
have been inevitable, as several of the cases in which the fair use defense prevailed coupled 
copyright and trademark claims. It is not surprising that the sardonic expressions that proved fair 
use for the copyright goose would lead to similar treatment for the trademarks gander, 
particularly when the avian species at issue was a bird called Barbie. 
 
Just as copyright law has influenced the development of trademark doctrine in the US, so has 
trademark law evolved a reciprocal relationship with copyright, potentially extending the 
protection of certain copyrighted works, notably cartoon characters, beyond the copyright term. 
Justice Scalia decried the resort to trademark law to generate “a species of mutant copyright law 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) B V T/A Sabmark International 
2005 1 SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
2
 Id. at 70. 
3
 See, e.g., Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“Gucchi Goo” diaper bags 
held likely to be confused with Gucci handbags); Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 
1987) (“Mutant of Omaha” anti-nuclear protest items such as coffee mugs and posters held likely to be confused 
with “Mutual of Omaha” insurance services; Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 
1994) (“Michelob Oily” parody ad in SNICKER humor magazine held likely to confuse the public as to its approval 
by the producers of Michelob Dry beer); Harriette K. Dorson, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, 
Trademark and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REV. 923 (1985).  
4
 See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Spy Notes” 
parody of Cliffs Notes, no likelihood of confusion found); Yankee Publishing v. News America Publishing, 809 F. 
Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (New York Magazine parody of cover of Old Farmer’s Almanac cover, no likelihood of 
confusion found); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp.2d 495 (E. D. Va. 2006) 
(“HDD sells products such as Chewnel # 5, Dog Perignon, Chewy Vuiton, and Sniffany & Co. in pet stores, 
alongside other dog toys, bones, beds, and food, and most are priced around $ 10;” neither likelihood of confusion 
nor dilution found). 
5
 Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
6
 See Pierre N Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 208 (2004) (in federal 
anti dilution act Congress is saying to courts, “You have shown in your development of fair use in copyright that 
you know how to limit the scope of a broadly-written exclusivity statute - to keep it in line with the needs of free 
expression. We are relying on you to do that here. Create appropriate doctrines of "fair use" to keep the Dilution Act 
within reasonable bounds.”). See also generally Rebecca Tushnet, Make Me Walk, Make Me Talk, Do Whatever You 
Please: Barbie and Exceptions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 405–
26 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, eds. 2014); Jane C. Ginsburg, Of Mutant Copyrights, Mangled 
Trademarks, and Barbie’s Beneficence: The Influence of Copyright on Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND 
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 481 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, eds. 2008).  




that limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use,’ expired copyrights.”
7
  But, as we will 
see, differences in the nature and purpose of copyright and trademark law in fact permit the 
revival of dead copyrights as trademarks. Copyright policy, however, may constrain the quantity 
of bodies that those zombies may snatch. 
 
In this essay, I will first address how the US copyright fair use doctrine has allowed US federal 
judges in trademarks cases to connect with their inner comic impulses.  Second, I will consider 
the conflict between trademark law’s potentially eternal duration and copyright’s constitutionally 
mandated limited times, particularly in the context of visual characters such as Mickey Mouse.  
Finally, as further evidence of copyright/trademark reciprocity, I will evoke a newer trend, the 
refashioning of trademark symbols into copyrighted characters. 
 
How Barbie Made Trademarks Judges Lighten Up 
 
Lawful unauthorized uses of trademarks of course predate both the Mattel toy company
8
 
and the 1946 Lanham Act
9
.  In 1924, in a case concerning the labeling of lawfully purchased and 
rebottled perfume, Justice Holmes famously declared “When the mark is used in a way that does 
not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the 
truth. It is not taboo.”
10
    
 
The Lanham Act codified part of this precept by permitting the use of descriptive terms 
in a registered trademark for the purpose of description, and not as a trademark.
11
  For example, 
if ZEST is a trademark for a lemon-lime soda, the registrant cannot prohibit a competitor from 
informing the public that its lemon-lime soda, call it FIZZUP, includes lemon zests, or that it has 
a zesty taste.   But the Lanham Act does not explicitly exempt a competitor’s use of ZEST to 
describe the competitor’s product, for example, to proclaim that FIZZUP tastes better than, has 
more bubbles than, or fewer calories than, ZEST.
12
  Nor does the Lanham Act explicitly allow a 
non competitor, such as the (fictitious) magazine Teen Taste to elicit its readers’ beverage 










                                                 
7
 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003). 
8
 Mattel, Inc. is an American multinational toy manufacturing company founded in 1945. 
9
 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. (2013). 
10
 Prestonettes, Inc., v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (citing Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 
327 (1871)). 
11






 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th
 
Cir. 1992); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 
279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(following Ninth Circuit). Other circuits reach the same result through similar reasoning, albeit without applying the 
label “nominative fair use.” See, e.g., Universal Commun. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424-25 (1st Cir. 2007). 
See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, Non-Confusing Nominative Fair Use, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 




   The nominative fair use defense to trademark infringement proceeds through an 
analysis of factors.
15
 As we will see, these factors complement and echo the first, third, and 




Although in US law copyright is a property “right in gross,” and trademark is not (or is 
not supposed to be) such a right, the trademark and copyright fair use limitations have this in 
common: the users of the mark or of another author’s work are engaged in independent 
economic or creative activity.  They are not simply redistributing another’s work of authorship
17
 
or appending another’s mark to the same or confusingly similar goods.  Rather, (at least for 
traditional copyright fair use) they are making a new work, or, on the trademark side, pro 
claiming their own goods or communicative activities.
18
   By the same token, the uses do not 
unfairly usurp the copyright or trademark owner’s markets.  A devastating review may dampen 
desire for the critiqued work, but that kind of harm is not cognizable in copyright.
19
  Similarly, a 
comparative advertisement may persuade consumers of the superior merits of the competitor’s 




Trademark “fair use” may have received its greatest impetus from decisions involving 
overlapping claims of copyright and trademark infringement, for it is not surprising that once a 
court has found the use to be “transformative” and to promote speech and/or learning, and thus 
most often to be “fair” in the copyright sense, that court is unlikely to find the same activity to 
violate the copyright holder’s trademark in the copied work.  Nonetheless, the first of the 
“Barbie” cases to find nominative fair use in trademark law did not involve copyright 
infringement, though it did concern a parody.
21
   In that case, the song “Barbie Girl” by the 
Danish one-hit group “Aqua” in 1997 foisted on the airwaves lyrics like the following, nasally 
sung to a catchy refrain: “I’m a Barbie girl, in a Barbie world. Life in plastic, it's fantastic. You 
can brush my hair, undress me everywhere. Imagination, life is your creation. . . . I'm a blond 
bimbo girl, in a fantasy world. Dress me up, make it tight, I'm your dolly.” To which the bass in 
the group would interject in a froggish croak (Aqua’s album was, after all, called “Aquarium”): 
                                                 
15
 “First, the plaintiff's product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the 
trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
plaintiff's product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” New Kids, supra note 14, at 306. 
16
 See 17 USC § 107(1), (3), (4). 
17
 In narrow circumstances of “market failure,” redistributive uses may be ruled “fair,” but the kinds of uses at issue 
in the copyright/trademark overlap cases are more traditionally “transformative,” such as parodies.  
18
 Fair use of another’s trademark to describe the trademark owner’s goods, as lawfully repackged and resold by the 
defendant (the situation, for example, in Prestonettes), does not, admittedly, involve the same kind of independent 
economic activity. Permitting the use of the mark, however, is a necessary corollary to the “exhaustion” or “first 
sale” doctrine, which permits third parties to resell trademarked (or copyrighted) goods once they have been 
lawfully sold. If the reseller cannot inform the public what the resold goods are, the exhaustion doctrine will, as a 
practical matter, have little impact. Cf. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 US 111, 118 (1938) (once patent 
expired, and competitors are free to manufacture the goods, they also are entitled to call the goods “the name by 
which [they] had become known”).  
19
 See, e.g., Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994).  
20
 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.1968) (smell-alike perfume); August Storck K.G. v. 
Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.1995) (competing candies). 
21








Holding that “the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse 
whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function,” 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the likelihood of confusion claim.
23
  Following Second Circuit 
precedent, the Ninth Circuit balanced the “public interest in free expression” against the “public 
interest in avoiding consumer confusion,” and accorded the former decisive weight unless the 
song title’s appropriation of Barbie “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, 
or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the 
content of the work.”
24
   Observing that the Barbie doll was the target of the song, the court held 
the group was entitled to identify the butt of its joke, and had done nothing to mislead the public 
into thinking that Mattel authorized the song. (Ironically, Mattel subsequently licensed “Barbie 




The other Barbie trademark fair use decision challenged photographs irreverently 
portraying Barbie dolls, and thus implicated both copyright (the reproduction right in the image 
of the dolls) and trademarks (use of the Barbie name in the titles of the photographs).
26
  The 
extensive analysis of copyright fair use almost certainly drove the subsequent findings of 
unlikelihood of confusion.  In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., the producer of Barbie 
tried to enjoin an artist from distributing his series, “Food Chain Barbie” which depicted Barbie 
victimized by a variety of kitchen appliances (and appearing occasionally to enjoy it).
27
   
 
In granting summary judgment on the copyright claim, the court ruled on the first fair use 
factor that the Food Chain series “parod[ies] Barbie and everything Mattel's doll has come to 
signify. Undoubtedly, [the court continued] one could make similar statements through other 
means about society, gender roles, sexuality, and perhaps even social class. But Barbie, and all 
the associations she has acquired through Mattel's impressive marketing success, conveys these 
messages in a particular way that is ripe for social comment.”
28
   On the third factor, the court 
stressed that parodies need not restrict themselves “to take the absolute minimum amount of the 
copyrighted work possible,” and thus that, in context, reproducing the entire doll did not 
undermine the fair use defense.
29
   On the fourth factor, the court found it unlikely that Mattel 
would enter the market for “adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie.”
30
 
    
The Ninth Circuit approvingly cited another Barbie copyright parody decision, Mattel, 
Inc. v. Pitt, in which the defendant’s “dungeon doll” website offered to customize Barbie dolls in 
                                                 
22
 Aqua, Barbie Girl (1997), available on Youtube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyhrYis509A (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2017).  
23
 Mattel, supra note 21, at 900. 
24
 Id at 902 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
25
 See Stuart Elliott, Years Later Mattel Embraces “Barbie Girl,” NEW YORK TIMES, August 26, 2009 4:30 pm, 
https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/years-later-mattel-embraces-barbie-girl/ (last visited Nov. 28, 
2017). 
26






 Id. at 802. 
29
 Id. at 804. 
30




a variety of dominatrix modes.
31
  The differently-accessorized dolls arguably violated Mattel’s 
exclusive right to create derivative works based on Barbie, and the website’s photographs 
allegedly violated the reproduction right.  The Southern District of New York considered the 
statutory fair use factors, and ruled the defendant’s use and context of Barbie sufficiently 
transformative and unlikely to supplant one of Mattel’s markets for the work.
32
  As the district 




Having held defendant’s use to be “fair” as a matter of copyright law, notably because of 
the expressive values the parody advanced, the Ninth Circuit in “Food Chain Barbie” effectively 
sealed the fate of the trademark claim.
34
  With respect to Food Chain’s incorporation of Barbie in 
the title of the series, the court relied on its prior decision in the Barbie Girl song case to reject a 
likelihood of confusion claim.
35
   
 
With respect to Food Chain’s alleged violation of Mattel’s trade dress rights by 
reproducing the Barbie figure (largely undressed), the court ruled the copying nominative fair 
use.
36
  The court stated: “Forsythe used Mattel's Barbie figure and head in his works to conjure 
up associations of Mattel, while at the same time to identify his own work, which is a criticism 
and parody of Barbie. Where use of the trade dress or mark is grounded in the defendant's desire 
to refer to the plaintiff's product as a point of reference for defendant's own work, a use is 
nominative.”
37
  “Conjure up,” notably, is a standard formulation of the minimum extent of 
copying that the copyright fair use caselaw permits in a parody.
38
  Not surprisingly, then, the 
court’s analysis of the second nominative fair use factor echoed its treatment of the third 
copyright fair use factor.
39
  By the same token, having found as a matter of copyright law that the 
defendant was not usurping a potential market for “adult photos” that Mattel was likely to enter, 
the court ruled on the third nominative fair use factor that “it is highly unlikely that any 





From laughable Barbie to eternal Mickey Mouse? 
 
 We have seen that copyright law-limiting doctrines can bear on the scope of trademark 
protection.  If copyright can cut back on trademarks, can trademarks extend copyrights?  
Copyright and trademarks often overlap, particularly in visual characters. The same figure may 
qualify as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work on the one hand, and as a registered trademark 
on the other. The two rights, though resting on distinct foundations
41
, tend to be licensed (and, as 
                                                 
31
 Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
32




 Mattel, supra note 26. 
35
 Id. at 804. (“In both Forsythe's use of the entire doll and his use of dismembered parts of the doll, portions of the 
old work are incorporated into the new work but emerge imbued with a different character.”) 
36








 Id. at 811. 
40
 Id. at 812. 
41
 WILLIAM M. BORCHARD, A TRADEMARK IS NOT A COPYRIGHT OR A PATENT (2013), available at 




we have seen, litigated) together.
42
  Trademarks symbolize the goodwill of the producer, and are 
protected insofar as copying that symbol is likely to confuse consumers as to the source or 
approval of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.
43
  The object of 
protection is the producer’s goodwill (in theory, as a proxy for consumer source identification), 
not (again, in theory) the mark per se. Copyright, by contrast, is a right “in gross” allowing its 
owner to prohibit the copying of the work without regard to source confusion.
44
  Copyright 
protects the work of authorship itself, not the identification of that work with a single, if 
anonymous, source of origin.
45
  Pursuant to the Constitutional grant to Congress of power to 
secure authors’ exclusive rights “for limited times,” copyright lasts for a term of years
46
; 
trademarks are protected for so long as they continue to represent a single producer’s goodwill. 
Subject to that prerequisite, registered trademarks maybe renewed indefinitely.
47
   
 
The durational disparity prompts the question whether a trademark owner may effectively 
perpetuate the life of the copyright in a visual character by controlling the use of the trademark in 
                                                                                                                                                             
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:5.A (4th ed. 2014) (‘The 
attorney must keep separate in his or her own mind the distinctions between patent, trademark and copyright law. 
One must be familiar with the similarities and the differences … Complex? Perhaps, but it is the attorney’s stock in 
trade at least to be aware of the possibilities of all kinds of legal protection and the pros and cons of each.’). 
42
 See, e.g., Craig S. Mende & Belinda Isaac, When Copyright and Trademark Rights Overlap, in OVERLAPPING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS para. 7.95 (Neil Wilkof & Shamnad Basheer eds., 2012). For an example of 
licensing of copyright and trademark rights in Disney characters, see Exhibit 4.3, Consumer Products License – 
Disney (4 June 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/55698/000095013502005035 
/b44497fyexv4w3.txt (last visited Nov. 28, 2017). By the same token, unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted 
work may also violate trademark rights, see, e.g. Williams v. Roberto Cavalli S.p.A, 113 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944 
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting defense that street artists’ claim of copyright infringement by fashion designer’s copying 
of their designs precluded any trademark action regarding the alleged source-identifying features of the designs): 
Moving Defendants point to no authority that supports their proposition that a design may not be 
protected by both the Lanham Act and copyright law. In fact, caselaw supports to the opposite 
conclusion. For example, in Bach v. Forever Living Products U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 
1114 (W.D. Wash. 2007), creators of a popular book brought both a copyright infringement claim 
and a Lanham Act claim alleging, among other things, that the defendant used an image from the 
front cover of their book as its corporate logo. The plaintiffs claimed that the cover was an original 
design protected by copyright law. Id. at 1118. They also claimed that the design on the cover 
functioned as a trade dress that identified them as the creators of the book. Id. The court agreed. 
Id. While the copyright claim and the Lanham Act claim referred to the same facts, the two claims 
addressed distinct wrongs. Id. The copyright claim protected the plaintiffs’ creative work, and the 
Lanham Act claim protected the plaintiffs’ rights in their source-identifying trade dress. Id. The 
Court is persuaded by Bach’s finding that a defendant can simultaneously violate the Lanham Act 
and copyright law.  
Id., at 13–14 (internal citations omitted).  See also DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1390 (2016) (holding the “Batmobile” both a copyrightable character and a protected trademark).  
43
 Lanham Act, supra note 9, at §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2013). 
44
 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2013) (listing the elements of an infringement claim). 
45
 Aside from the narrow category of Works of Visual Art, the U.S. Copyright Act imposes no obligation to credit 
the author as the creator of the work. 
46
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
47
 Lanham Act, supra note 9, at § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2013) (‘Subject to the provisions of section 8, each 
registration may be renewed for periods of 10 years at the end of each successive 10-year period following the date 
of registration upon payment of the prescribed fee and filing of a written application …’). The statute imposes no 






  For example, once the copyright in Mickey Mouse—or more accurately, in 
Steamboat Willie, Mickey’s forebear—expires, can Disney successfully invoke its trademark 
rights in various depictions of The Mouse to prevent third parties from exploiting the now public 
domain Steamboat Willie to designate the source or sponsorship of unauthorized goods or 
services?
49
   
 
While this question addresses trademarks and copyright as potential antagonists where 
exercise of trademark rights threatens to frustrate copyright policies, there is another side of the 
coin.
50
 To an increasing extent, we are seeing trademark symbols become characters and acquire 
value not only as source-indicators, but also as artistic (or audiovisual) works. Recent examples 
include the M&Ms candies, who, now anthropomorphized, appear in promotional videos and 
even videogames, and the Lego figures who starred in the Lego Movie and its so-far sequels, the 
Lego Batman Movie (piling on another copyright/TM property), and the Lego Ninjago Movie 
(which flopped). The phenomenon, however, is not altogether new, since some characters (e.g., 
Strawberry Shortcake) were created to serve both as copyrighted works and as trademarks. The 
strategy seems the logical endpoint of the progression, since at least the 1970s, which recognizes 
that the thing of value is the trademark, independently of any particular goods or services with 
which the mark has been associated.
51
   
                                                 
48
 The issue is confined neither to the overlap between trademarks and copyright nor to U.S. copyright law. The 
Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recently summarized the broader problem, 
in a controversy concerning trademark registration for the design of a children’s high chair: 
However, it should be recalled that the purpose of the system of trade mark protection, which 
serves to provide the bases for fair competition by enhancing market transparency, differs from the 
premises underlying certain other intellectual property rights which serve, in essence, to promote 
innovation and creativity. 
36. That difference in purposes explains why the protection conferred by marks is indefinite 
but the protection conferred by other intellectual property rights is subject to a time-limit imposed 
by the legislature. That limit results from the balance which is struck between the public interest in 
protecting innovation and creativity, on the one hand, and the economic interest based on the 
possibility of exploiting the intellectual achievements of other persons to promote future socio-
economic development, on the other. 
37 Exercise of a trade mark right in order to extend an exclusive right to immaterial assets 
protected by other intellectual property rights could—after those rights have expired—jeopardise 
the balance of interests which the legislature established inter alia by limiting the scope of 
protection conferred by those other rights. 
38 This problem is dealt with differently in different legal systems. The EU legislature 
resolved it by laying down the legislative criteria which can constitute an absolute ground for 
refusing a trade mark which is the shape of the goods. 
39 Those criteria … prevent a trade mark right from being exercised for a purpose which is 
incompatible with it … In particular, they also serve to maintain the balance of interests which the 
legislature established by placing a time-limit on the protection conferred by certain other 
intellectual property rights. 
2014 C.J.U.E. C‑205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v Stokke A/S, opinion of A.G. Szpunar (14 May 2014). The CJEU 
rendered its decision on 18 September 2014. 
49
 See generally Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 1427–40. 
50
 For further examination of trademark-copyright antagonism, see Irene Calboli, Overlapping Rights: The Negative 
Effects of Trademarking Creative Works, in THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
52 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2014). See also authorities cited infra note 107. 
51
 See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(acknowledging that protecting the trademark in itself (on patches to be sewn on clothing) is a shift, ‘[a]lthough our 





The U.S. Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., made 
clear that producers may not leverage trademark rights effectively to revive expired copyrights.
52
 
In that case, the copyright in a pre-1978 motion picture had expired through nonrenewal.
53
  The 
producer nonetheless endeavored to prevent a third party from making and distributing 
videocassettes of the film by claiming that purveying the videocassettes under the defendant’s 
name rather than as a production by 20th Century Fox constituted “reverse passing off” in 
violation of the Lanham Act.
54
  The Supreme Court limited the statutory trademark concept of a 
work’s “origin” to the source of the material copies of a work of authorship, and therefore ruled 
that trademark law did not address the creator of the intellectual goods.
55
  Because Dastar had 
made (or authorized the making of) the videocassettes that it distributed, it was the “source or 
origin” of the material copies.
56
  It was irrelevant that Dastar had not produced the audiovisual 




If trademark law cannot bootstrap a work of authorship out of the copyright public 
domain, does that mean that a visual character whose copyright has expired cannot be a 
trademark? Dastar does not foreclose that inquiry. In that case, the former copyright holder 
clearly sought to make an end-run around the copyright law; under the court’s analysis, the 
plaintiff had no trademark rights to assert because the defendant’s use did not involve falsely 
designating itself as the origin of the goods. But suppose the trademark owner seeks to claim a 
copyright-expired visual character as a trademark, that is, as a designation of (material) origin for 
the goods or services on which the character appears as a distinctive sign? For example, a 
footware producer who adopts the title character of the now out-of-print Buster Brown comic 
books, as a brand name for a line of children’s shoes. In other words, to exploit the character as a 
brand, not as a work. Can the law effectively distinguish between the character as a literary and 
artistic work, and the character as the symbol of the goodwill of a single source of origin? But if 
the character can be an enforceable trademark, how can third parties exploit the character as a 
copyright-expired work?  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
business interests of plaintiffs, we think that the two become so intermeshed when viewed against the backdrop of 
the common law of unfair competition that both the public and plaintiffs are better served by granting the relief 
sought by plaintiffs.’); Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (‘Toeppen made a commercial 
use of Panavision’s trademarks. It does not matter that he did not attach the marks to a product. Toeppen’s 
commercial use was his attempt to sell the trademarks themselves.’). At least one circuit has viewed the ‘patch case’ 
with skepticism. See U.S. v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (‘We believe [Boston Professional] to be of 
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had not registered their marks for use on patches, the court essentially gave the plaintiffs a monopoly over use of the 
trademark in commercial merchandising.’); Liu, supra note 49. 
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, the EFTA Court
59
 recently confronted a similar issue regarding copyright-
expired sculptures by Gustav Vigeland, over a hundred of whose works adorn Frogner Park in 
Oslo.
60
  The Municipality of Oslo sought trademark protection for almost all the works in the 
park.
61
  The goods or services for which the municipality sought trademark registration are not 
clear from the EFTA court’s opinion, but in most instances the Norwegian intellectual property 
office denied registration, notably for lack of distinctiveness.
62
  That is, that the sculptures may 
have been well-known as artworks, but they were not recognized as designations of origin of 
goods or services of the Municipality of Oslo.  The Board of Appeal referred to the EFTA Court 
an additional ground for rejecting the application, asking whether trademarks consisting of 
copyright-expired artworks were “contrary to public policy or accepted principles of morality” 
under the EU Trademark Directive.
63
  While the Municipality of Oslo and the Norwegian 
government contended that no per se rule excluded trademark protection for copyright-expired 
works, the EU Commission argued that: 
 
the effect of granting a trade mark right would, in certain circumstances, be to perpetuate 
exclusive rights over the work of art, which should normally be in the public domain and 
capable of being freely used by any person including any economic operator. To 
appropriate a work of art for an indefinite period through the registration of a trade mark 
contradicts the very purpose and logic of the time limits established for copyright.
64
   
  
The EFTA court, however, declined to pronounce an absolute public policy exclusion of 
trademarks consisting of public domain artworks.  The Court ruled: “the registration of a sign 
that consists of works for which the copyright protection period has expired as a trade mark is 
not in itself contrary to public policy or accepted principles of morality.”
65
  The EFTA Court 
nonetheless acknowledged the possibility of “exceptional cases” when even artworks that had 
achieved distinctiveness as trademarks might nonetheless be denied registration.
66
  On remand,
67
 
the Norwegian Trademark Board of Appeal held that the Municipality of Oslo’s application 
presented such a case.
68
  The Board ruled: 
 
The seeking of trade mark protection is an indication that Oslo Municipality is attempting 
to maintain control over Vigeland’s artworks as works of art, inter alia because of the 
investments made in the promotion of the cultural heritage of Gustav Vigeland. This wish 
or interest is understandable, and could possibly mitigate the risk of others using the 
works of Gustav Vigeland in a manner contrary to public morality. On the other hand, 
such a wish does not safeguard any legitimate interest protected by the Trade Marks Act. 
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 November 13, 2017. 
68




On the contrary, the Board finds that trade mark registration on these grounds would 
contradict the considerations and fundamental societal interests justifying the limitation 
of the term of copyright protection of Vigeland’s works. To that end, the determining 
factor, from the Board’s point of view, is the Oslo Municipality’s systematic attempts to 




In other words, the attempt to register almost all the works in the park was the give-away that the 
Municipality was endeavoring to end-run the expiration of the copyright term by leveraging the 
trademark law into a zombie copyright law.  The Municipality’s solicitude for the moral interests 
in the sculptures may have been laudable, but it did not advance any trademark purpose.
70
  The 
Municipality was not seeking to develop a particular distinctive sign as a symbol of the goodwill 
of the city of Oslo in connection with particular goods or services, but was instead looking for a 




The Board’s reference to “the risk of others using the works of Gustav Vigeland in a manner 
contrary to public morality,” adverts to the EFTA court’s articulation of some public policy 
concerns distinct from the problem of duration.
72
  While the Municipality sought trademark 
registration in order to prevent third parties from making inappropriate uses of the sculptures, 
third parties might also attempt to register copyright-expired artworks as trademarks in order to 
advance uses that others might find problematic.
73
  The EFTA court noted: 
 
A trade mark registration may even be considered a misappropriation or a desecration of 
the artist’s work, in particular if it is granted for goods or services that contradict the 
values of the artist or the message communicated through the artwork in question. 
Therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that trade mark registration of an artwork 
may be perceived by the average consumer in the EEA State in question as offensive and 




In the US, after the Slants decision,
 75
 it may no longer be possible for the PTO to deny 
registration because the mark is “contrary to accepted principles of morality,” or, in Lanham Act 
section 2(a) terms, because the mark “Consists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter.”  
Nonetheless, consider the following advertising uses of public domain artworks (See Figure 1). 
If any were claimed as a trademark in the EU or the EEA, would the relevant authorities reject 
their applications for registration? 
 
Figure 1: Ray Ban/Raphael, portrait of Baldassare Castiglione
76
; Jim Beam/Whistler’s 
Mother
77
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visited Nov. 28, 2017). 
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ADWEEK (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.adweek.com/creativity/us-gun-ad-michelangelos-david-under-




Returning to the question whether trademark protection might effectively, and 
impermissibly, prolong the duration of protection of copyright-expired works, in the U.S., the 
Southern District of New York addressed these questions in a pre-Dastar decision that should 
still be good law. In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., the original publisher of Beatrix 
Potter’s Peter Rabbit illustrated stories, whose copyrights had expired, brought an action for false 
designation of origin against another publisher who had not only reprinted the stories, including 
the depictions of the characters, but also mimicked the placement on certain pages of the books 
of a particular illustration, the “Sitting Rabbit,” that Warne claimed to have adopted and used as 
a trademark to symbolize its publications.
80
 Book Sales countered that the expiration of the Peter 
Rabbit copyrights entitled it freely to copy all the images appearing in the books, including the 
Sitting Rabbit. Warne did not contest Book Sales’ entitlement to exploit all the images, including 
the Sitting Rabbit, as characters in the stories, but contended that Book Sales was not merely 
reprinting the image in connection with the story, but by removing that image from its context 
within the story in which it initially appeared and by using it as a colophon to introduce other 
stories, Book Sales was infringing Warne’s trademark rights in the image.  
 
In denying summary judgment to Book Sales, the court recognized that Warne would 
have to establish that its use of the Sitting Rabbit on the inside covers of its editions and as a 
colophon had come to be recognized by the public not merely as identifying the stories as Peter 
Rabbit stories, but also as Peter Rabbit stories as published by Frederick Warne.
81
 If Warne 
could establish such secondary meaning, then it would also need to show that Book Sales’ use of 
the Sitting Rabbit was likely to confuse consumers into believing that the Book Sales editions 
were produced or authorized by Warne.
82
 The court distinguished between Book Sales’ 
copyright entitlement to publish Peter Rabbit stories and Warne’s trademark right to prevent 




In Dastar terms, Warne was not seeking to deploy trademark law as a kind of “mutant 
copyright,”
84
 but rather was invoking trademark protection as precisely the kind of source 
identifier Dastar envisioned: Warne was arguing that the Sitting Rabbit designated Warne as the 
publisher—i.e., as the producer of the material copies of the books. Book Sales’ use of that 
image in the same ways (divorced from the story in which it originally appeared) was likely to 
confuse the public as to who made the books.
85
 The court emphasized that it was not necessary, 
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 Dastar, supra note 52, at 34 (‘Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar’s representation of itself as the 
‘Producer’ of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, 
allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that 
limits the public’s ‘federal right to ‘copy and to use’ expired copyrights …’). 
85
 Professor McCarthy also underscores the trademark significance of taking an image or character out of its original 
context. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 6:31. (‘It is more likely that a court will recognize that there is a federal 
right to reproduce a work on which copyright has ended, so long as the user does not take the images or characters 
out of their original context and use them in a way that causes confusion of source or affiliation.’). 
86




Warne suggests a way out of a potential impasse between the copyright public domain 
and trademark protection for visual characters vested with secondary meaning as source 
indicators. Returning to Mickey Mouse/Steamboat Willie, when the copyright in the 1928 
original iteration of the character expires, anyone should be free not only to reissue cartoons in 
which Steamboat Willie appeared, but also to create new works starring the original, rather rat-
like, incarnation of the softer, rounder Mouse we know today. Those exploiters could not, 
however, market Steamboat Willie as Mickey, nor could they brand their versions with any of 
the current Disney trademarks, for those uses both exceed the exploitation of merely the public 
domain pictorial or audiovisual work, and might be likely to confuse consumers as to the 
purveyor of the recycled or reimagined Steamboat Willie cartoons or other works. 
 
But the observation that Disney continues to control the licensing of its current 
trademarks invites the development of Steamboat Willie as a trademark for Disney productions 
in general before the Steamboat Willie copyright expires. And Disney does in fact appear to be 
dusting off that character to convert it into a source indicator: A video included at the 
introduction of recent Disney films begins with the current image of Mickey Mouse and travels 
back in time to the early depictions of Steamboat Willie (See Figure 2).
87
 The object of this 
flashback would appear to be to associate Steamboat Willie with the Disney output in general, 
rather than merely as a character in some early cartoons. 
 





Would that course of action now put the Steamboat Willie character off-limits to all but 
those who take a license from Disney? If Steamboat Willie becomes a brand in its own right, 
would it not follow that its unlicensed appearance would confuse the public as to the source of 
the copies or transmissions of the work containing an incarnation of the character? There are two 
answers: First, under Warne, the trademark consists of a particular instantiation of the character 
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in a particular source-identifying guise divorced from its story-telling context.
89
 The court took 
pains to ensure that the first publisher could not bootstrap all Peter Rabbit images to the single 
image used in the colophon and book covers.
90
 Warne’s use of the Sitting Rabbit in ways distinct 
from that image’s role in the story from which Warne extracted it signaled that this incarnation 
of the character was source-identifying rather than narrative.
91
   
 
By the same token, Steamboat Willie, the brand, should remain distinct from Steamboat 
Willie, the character.
92
 Dr. Seuss’ The Cat in the Hat offers an example of the distinction.
93
 The 
Cat, the character, stars in two eponymous children’s stories (See Figure 3). The Cat, the brand 
(a single image of the grinning Cat in his striped stovepipe hat), adorns the spines and front and 





Figure 3: The Cat in the Hat: The Brand
95
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When the Dr. Seuss books fall into the public domain, anyone may republish them, but 
the subsistence of trademark rights in the Cat as part of the trade dress of the Random House 
book series means that any unlicensed versions of that image of the Cat may not appear on the 
spines, back covers, or upper right hand corners of the front covers of those republications. 
Similarly, post-copyright expiration, a producer who seeks to merchandize images of Steamboat 
Willie as ornamentation on T-shirts or to sell Steamboat Willie plush toys may do so, and may 
lawfully identify the character as Steamboat Willie
96
, but (assuming Disney succeeds in 
converting the character into a brand) the label must forego all Disney insignia, whether of 




One might respond that, given the close association of the character with Disney, any 
incarnation, as a label or as a good, is bound to confuse the public as to the source. This 
objection, if borne out by facts, brings us to the second answer: In that event, copyright and 
trademark policies clash, and, as Dastar implies, the public domain principle of copyright 
prevails.
98
 The public domain makes the character free for competition. Assuming the character 
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has also served as a trademark, trademark law enables the former copyright owner to ensure that 
free competition be fair competition. But remedies short of full injunctions may achieve 
“fairness”: A court should decline to grant the trademark owner any relief other than the clear 
labeling of disclaimers as to the source of the competing goods.
99
   
 
An additional consideration complicates the analysis, however. The copyright lives of 
visual characters may in fact last far longer than the copyright term of the character’s initial 
incarnation. Many characters evolve over time, and later manifestations may depart sufficiently 
from the original version to qualify as copyright-protected derivative works.
100
  The new matter 
added to the underlying work cannot prolong the copyright in the pre-existing material, but 
neither does the public domain status of the underlying material deprive the new matter of its 
own copyright.
101
 If the term of protection is calculated from the date of publication, rather than 
from the life of the author, as would be the case in the US for works published before 1978 and 
for post-1978 works made for hire, the copyright in the new matter will subsist past the term of 
the copyright in the underlying work.
102
 These rules mean that third parties who may freely 
reproduce copyright-expired characters may exploit the character as it originally appeared.  But 
they may not copy the appearance of the character as it has developed over time. Similarly, while 
third parties may newly vary the character’s visual appearance, those variations must not 
resemble those introduced by the owner of the copyright in the derivative work. As a result, the 
commercial value of reviving the original appearance of the character may be too insignificant to 
attract a mass-market audience. 
 
Consider the following example: The Michelin Man, “Bibendum,” having first appeared 
in Michelin advertisements in the late 19th century, has long been in the copyright public 
domain. But just as the spindly and snout-nosed Steamboat Willie’s contours have over time 
taken on a more friendly and reassuring roundness, so has Bibendum evolved from a bon vivant 
blob
103
, an almost featureless stack of narrow tubular shapes, into a still-robust but more sportif 
assemblage of thicker forms showing greater differentiation in torso, limbs, and especially facial 
characteristics (See Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Bibendum then and now
104
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Anyone may republish the nineteenth-century advertising posters (for which there may 
well be a market), but the merchandising opportunities for the original Bibendum do not seem 
promising. One might imagine (carefully labeled) throw pillows in the shape of the original 
Bibendum, but a third party would be ill-advised to enter the market for a restaurant or tour 
guides featuring images of the nineteenth-century version of the Michelin mascot, for those uses 
are not exploiting the character qua character; they embrace the goodwill of the publishing arm 
of Michelin, and would be likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the guide books. In 
other words, the original Bibendum may be freely exploitable as a matter of copyright law, but it 
does not follow that the original character may be indiscriminately used by third parties as a 
trademark.   
 
When the Trademark Owner Becomes a Copyright Owner: Trademarks as Copyrighted Works 
 
Most of the commentary on copyright/trademark overlaps focuses (generally, 
unfavorably) on attempts to extend the copyright monopoly through trademark protection.
105
  
But there is another side of the coin: the development of trademarks into copyrightable 
characters and other visual goods. Perhaps because a trademark may lack sufficient authorship to 
qualify as a “work” and because, in theory, a trademark does not confer a right in gross to exploit 
the symbol as an independent object of property, we recently see the adaptation of trademarks 
into the object of copyrights through the endowment of images not only with brand significance, 
but also with personalities and other attributes that convert the source-identifier into a literary, 
                                                 
105
 The rights that revert to the author or her heirs are unlikely to enable her to block the trademark owner’s 
exploitation of the image as a trademark. If the trademark is a later representation of the character, the derivative 
works carve-out will preclude the author’s claim. If the trademark is the original image, in which copyright rights 
have reverted, 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(5) indicates that reversion will not terminate the right to license the image as a 
trademark; to the extent that copyright reproduction rights necessarily accompany the licensing of trademark rights, 
the statutory direction that copyright termination does not ‘affect’ other rights, would mean that the trademark 




artistic, or (most often) audiovisual character.
106
 The creation of characters designed pervasively 
to permeate children’s media environment through a combination of branding consumer goods 
(such as breakfast cereal) and producing animated television shows and associated toys, all 
featuring the characters, is a familiar strategy in the US at least since the advent of the 




Nonetheless, the current evolution of trademarks into copyrighted works is different 
because in their commercial lives these trademarks were not born as characters, but rather had 
the anthropomorphizing touches that turned them into characters later thrust upon them. 
Moreover, without those flourishes, the trademarks might have lacked sufficient authorship to 
warrant copyright protection. The red disk of the 7-UP dot, for example, seems too basic to 
survive even a cursory Copyright Office examination for originality. But accessorize it with arms 
and legs and coif it with a pair of sunglasses, and a banal form blossoms into the “Cool Spot” 
character (See Figure X). 
 














Or take the rudimentary, single-colored shapes of M&Ms candies, endow them with arms 
and legs and a range of highly expressive (if rather gender-stereotyped) facial features, and they 
become “spokescandies” with pre-packaged personalities and backstories.
109
  Moreover, 
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trademarks-as-characters star not only in advertising for the trademarked goods, but also in 





We have seen what copyright owners have to gain (or hope to gain) from claiming 
trademark protection for visual characters. What can copyright contribute to the protection of 
trademarks? First, because copyright is a right in gross, it strengthens the coverage available 
even to marks sufficiently famous to qualify for anti dilution protection. Copyright is infringed 
by copying; trademark infringement requires a showing that the copying causes a likelihood of 
confusion or of association that is likely to “blur” or “tarnish” a famous mark.
111
  It is true that in 
recent years, at least since the mid-1970s in the US, trademark protection has increasingly come 
to bear on brand symbols in their own right, independent of the goods or services in connection 
with which they initially appeared.
112
  Trademark law thus has been adapting to the reality, well 
established in the world of marketing, that the thing of value is the trademark; particularly for 
famous marks, the goods to which the brand applies are increasingly ancillary.
113
  If in the past, 
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Moreover, from the trademark owner’s perspective, there is little if any downside to 
recasting a trademark as a copyrightable work of authorship. While the fair use doctrine limits 
the scope of copyright protection—particularly for parody, criticism, and commentary—the 
developments over the last twenty years of US trademark law, as we have seen, have given rise 
to the “nominative fair use” defense and have imported copyright fair use concepts to excuse 
parodies and other critical uses of trademarks.
115
  As a result, whether they are the objects of 
trademarks or of copyrights, visual characters seem equally susceptible to legally-privileged 
copying for purposes of mockery or social commentary. Copyright therefore does not diminish 
the protection the characters would enjoy as a matter of trademark law. Admittedly, the 
copyrights will in the US expire 95 years from the first publication of the trademarks-as-
characters (assuming they are works made for hire), but during that very long stretch, the 
trademark owner will have ample time to update the character and start another 95-year clock 
rolling.  
 
Finally, copyright offers significant remedial advantages over trademarks. The principal 
remedy for trademark infringement is injunctive relief.
116
  Damages require a showing of actual 
confusion; a trademark owner would be disinclined to wait to seek relief until consumers can be 
shown to have been confused in fact.
117





In conclusion, in the reciprocal relationship between copyright and trademarks, we have 
seen the limiting doctrines of one type of IP right, copyright, come to the aid of third-party 
speech interests respecting another kind of IP right, trademarks.  But, within those limitations, 
we have also seen how these rights complement and reinforce each other, to the benefit of the 
businesses that exploit them. 
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